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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as Untimely Because
He Presented an Issue of Fact as to Whether His Mental State Prevented Him From
Timely Filing a Post-Conviction Petition

The district court erred in failing to address Mr. Woodley's claim that the time to file his
post conviction petition should be equitably tolled as a result of his mental incapacity. Because
Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether his mental illness and medications
prevented him from timely filing the post-conviction action, the district court's e1TOr requires that
this matter be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
The state acknowledges that Mr. Woodley presented evidence that he suffered from
depression for several years and that the depression has been sufficiently severe to lead to suicide
attempts and hospitalizations. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. The state further admits it can be
inferred that Mr. Woodley was "incapable of acting on his post-conviction rights at or near the
times of his hospitalizations." Id. The state nonetheless claims that the district court's dismissal
of Mr. Woodley's petition as untimely should be affirmed because this evidence does not show
he was "incapacitated for the entire 16 months between the remittitur and the filing of the
petition." Id.
However, Mr. Woodley was not required to show that he was incapacitated for the entire
sixteen months between the issuance of the remittitur on his direct appeal and the filing of the
post-conviction petition. Further, it can be inferred from the evidence presented that Mr.
Woodley was sufficiently incapacitated for the applicable time frame and, thus, his petition
should not have been dismissed as untimely.

1.

Pertinent period of incapacity

A sufficiently incapacitating mental illness can equitably toll the statute of limitations for
post-conviction proceedings. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct App.
2003). '"Tolling' refers to suspending or stopping the running of a statute oflimitations; it is
analogous to a clock stopping, then restarting." Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Services and

Rehabilitation Center, 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (S.C. 2009), citing 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of
Actions§ 169 (2000).
Thus, Mr. Woodley defeated summary dismissal of his petition by establishing a factual
issue as to whether incapacity arising from depression or the side effects of his medication
stopped the one year clock from running for at least four months. In urging that Mr. Woodley
was required to demonstrate sixteen months of incapacity, the state relies on an excerpt from

Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App. 2011) in which the Court of Appeals
discussed our Supreme Court's application of the discovery exception in Evensiosky v. State, 136
Idaho 189, 30 P .3d 967 (2001 ). In Evensiosky, the petitioner had discovered the facts giving rise
to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the expiration of the statute oflimitation.
The Court held that because the petitioner had sufficient time thereafter to file a petition, there
was no basis to apply a discovery exception. Evensiosky, 136 Idaho at 191, 30 P.3d at 969.
Neither Schultz nor Evensiosky discussed equitable tolling based on mental illness. Instead, in

Schultz, the Court concluded that equitable tolling did not apply because the petitioner did not
diligently pursue his post-conviction rights.
The legislature determined that persons should have one year from the time a conviction
becomes final to prepare a post-conviction petition
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a length of time that contemplates that such

petitions are not counseled, investigated and drafted overnight. When incapacity renders a
petitioner incapable of pursing post-conviction rights for part of the limitation period, the
limitation period stops, or is tolled, until capacity is regained. Therefore, Mr. Woodley was not
required to show incapacity for the entire sixteen months the issuance of the remittitur on his
direct appeal and the filing of the post-conviction petition.
2:

Sufficient incapacity can be reasonably inferred from the record

Courts must liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party-here, Mr. Woodley. See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277,
1281 (2010). As acknowledged by the state, the record demonstrates that Mr. Woodley was
hospitalized on more than one occasion and it is reasonable to infer that Mr. Woodley was
sufficiently ill during his hospitalizations and that he was incapable of acting on his postconviction rights. It is further reasonable to infer that Mr. Woodley's severe depression and
treatment prevented him from exercising his post-conviction rights following his
hospitalizations.
Mr. Woodley was hospitalized for suicidal ideation and self-mutilation the same month
the remittitur was issued - November 2007 - and was again hospitalized at the Idaho Maximum
Security Institute on April 23, 2008, after suffering from a breakdown during the period of
retainedjurisdiction. R. (38195) 36, 41, 43; State's Exhibit A (38348). In May 2008, the prison
staff opined that Mr. Woodley's cognitive distortions and difficulty grasping and applying
concepts warranted a second rider. R. (3 8195) 41-43. It is reasonable to infer from this record
that Mr. Woodley's depression incapacitated him not only during his hospitalizations but, also,
throughout the periods in between and following.
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Because post-conviction actions are tried to the judge rather than a jury, the judge in a
post-conviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the
motion for summary disposition and can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct.
App. 2008). Here, however, the district court made no such findings because it refused to toll the
statute of limitations on an incorrect theory and this Court must construe all reasonable
inferences in Mr. Woodley's favor. When the reasonable inferences are drawn in Mr. Woodley's
favor, he has established an issue of fact as to whether his mental status was sufficiently
incapacitating to toll the statute of limitations.
The state incorrectly asserts that the record demonstrates that Mr. Woodley "was not
prescribed psychotropic medication, but an antidepressant." Respondent's Brief, p. 9. It is
possible that the state is mistakenly equating psychotropic medication with anti-psychotics.
However, the term psychotropic medication includes a wide variety of medications used to treat
an array of mental illnesses and disorders and include antidepressants, anti-psychotics, mood
stabilizers, anti-obsessive agents, anti-anxiety agents and anti-panic agents and stimulants. See

i.e. National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) table of Commonly Prescribed Psychotropic
Medications, available online at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Policymakers
_ Toolkit& Template=/ContentManagement/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=l 8971.
The district court erred in denying Mr. Woodley's motion for equitable tolling on the
basis that counsel was appointed to represent him in the underlying criminal proceedings during
the relevant time period. Additionally, Mr. Woodley presented an issue of fact as to whether

4

mental illness and psychotropic medication prevented him from timely filing a post-conviction
action. This Court should therefore reverse the district court's order denying equitable tolling
and remand the case for further proceedings.

B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because Counsel Had an Obligation to Advise Him That the Issues Raised
in His Pro Se Motions Would Be Properly Raised in a Post-Conviction Petition and
the State's Conduct Was Misleading

Mr. Woodley diligently pursued his ineffective assistance of counsel claims within the
statute of limitations but incorrectly did so by filing his pro se motions instead of a document
titled petition for post-conviction relief. Counsel appointed to represent Mr. Woodley in the
criminal case actively assisted Mr. Woodley in pursuing his claims through the incorrect vehicle
and, thus, counsel had an obligation to advise Mr. Woodley of his post-conviction rights. The
state further misled Mr. Woodley by misinforming him regarding the statute oflimitations.
These circumstances deprived Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his postconviction claims and the case should be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed
claims.
The state's only response to this argument is its incorrect assertion that the issue was not
raised below. Respondent's Brief, p. 11-12. To the contrary, Mr. Woodley raised counsel's
ineffective assistance in failing to timely file a post-conviction petition in response to the district
court's finding that Mr. Woodley was not entitled to equitable tolling because he "was
represented by able counsel who were charged with representing [his] legal interests" during the
relevanttimeframe. R.(38195) 110, 132-136, 144.
Mr. Woodley argued "when the Court denied equitable tolling of the statute oflimitation
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... it wholly proved" that counsel was ineffective "because counsel failed to file a timely postconviction petition." R. (38195) 132. Mr. Woodley then outlined counsel's performance and
argued that if counsel had done "his homework he would have discovered that the Court's breach
could have only been brought through post-conviction petition." Id. at 134. However, counsel
"did not amend complaint to post-conviction relief, nor did he file a petition for post-conviction
relief." Id. at 13 5. Counsel "remained attorney of record before and after the expiration of the
statute of limitation on post-conviction relief." Id. at 135. "Counsel had sufficient time and
evidence to prepare a successful post-conviction petition, however, he did not." Id. at 136.
"Ultimately, had counsel filed a timely post-conviction petition, [Mr. Woodley] would have been
entitled to withdraw his plea and the outcome of this case would be different." Id.

In his third amended petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Woodley alleged that if he
had received effective assistance of counsel, his petition for post-conviction relief would have
been timely filed and the state would not be claiming the petition was untimely. R. (3 8195) 186.

In response, the state argued that the attorney appointed in the criminal case was not appointed to
represent him in post-conviction. Tr. p. 90, In. 4 - p. 91, ln. 2. Mr. Woodley replied that counsel
was required to investigate and take a look at "post-conviction procedures and the rights thereof."

Id. at p. 97, In. 4-21. 1 Mr. Woodley also argued, as he did in his Appellant's Brief in this appeal,
that he was misled by the state's argument against his motion to withdraw his guilty plea that the
statute oflimitation to file a post-conviction petition had already expired. Tr. p. 98, In. 1-14;
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. In its order granting the state's motion for summary dismissal in

1

Mr. Woodley personally made these arguments on his behalf with the leave of the Court
and counsel. Tr. p. 96, In. 6-15.
6

part, the district court concluded that Mr. Woodley did not timely raise his allegation that counsel
failed to timely file a post-conviction petition regarding the district court's breach of the Plea
Agreement. Id. at 209.
Accordingly, Mr. Woodley argued to the district court that his post-conviction petition
was not timely filed as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court erred in
dismissing this claim as untimely rather than recognizing that counsel's ineffective assistance
and the state's misleading conduct gave rise to exceptional circumstances excusing the statute of
limitations. This case should therefore be remanded for further proceedings on the dismissed
claims.
C.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Woodley's Claims as
Untimely Because the Pro Se Motions Tolled the Time to File a Motion For PostConviction Relief
Mr. Woodley timely raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in pleadings

that were mislabeled as "motions" instead of as a "petition" for post-conviction relief. The
failure to liberally construe Mr. Woodley's prose motions as initiating a post-conviction action
or as tolling the time to initiate such an action deprives Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity
to present his claims in violation of the procedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In response to this argument, the state claims the issue was not raised below and has been
resolved by State v. Woodley, Docket No. 38348 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2011). Respondent's Brief,
p. 11-12. However, at the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Woodley
argued:
Now the motion to withdraw a plea may have been titled improperly. If it, if it
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would have been construed liberally by right, it could have been construed as a
post-conviction procedures motion. It could have been amended to that. It should
have been amended to that. The Court should have, should have looked at it,
construed it liberally. That's my argument
Tr. p. 99, ln. 25 - p. 100, ln.7. Mr. Woodley thus argued that his prose motions should toll the
statute of limitations to the district court.
The state is correct in noting that the Court of Appeals refused to consider Mr. Woodley's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea as a post-conviction petition in the recent appeal from the
district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 2 The Court of Appeals was
required to reach such holding in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Jakoski,
139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), which specifically refused to construe a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea as initiating a post-conviction action. However, as argued in Mr.
Woodley's Opening Brief in this case, the rule in Jakoski is fundamentally unfair and deprives
pro se inmates of a meaningful opportunity to present their post-conviction claims. Appellant's
Brief, p. 11-13.
Accordingly, Jakoski should be overruled and Mr. Woodley's prose motions should be
liberally construed as initiating a post-conviction action or as tolling the time to initiate such an
action. The failure to do so would deprive Mr. Woodley of a meaningful opportunity to present
his claims and would therefore violate the procedural due process guarantee of the Fourteenth

2

The appeal from the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw plea was permitted
as post-conviction relief on Mr. Woodley's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file
an appeal from that denial - the only claim that the district court allowed to proceed as timely. R.
248-49. The district court mistakenly believed that the claim "encompassed all of the previous
ineffective assistance of counsel claims." R. 208. However, as evidenced by the Court of
Appeals' holding in that appeal, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be reached
as a result of the jurisdictional issues implicated by Jakoski 's holding.
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Amendment to the United States Constitution.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Woodley respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing in part his petition for postconviction relief and to remand this case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
the dismissed claims.
Respectfully submitted this

ff

day of December, 2011.

NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Robyn yffe
Attorney for Alexander Jason Woodley
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

/j_ day of December, 2011, I caused two true and

correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Criminal Division, Office
of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-001 .
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